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Abstract:  
We study the effect of a subtle change in the choice architecture on offsetting behavior. In a 
large-scale field experiment, we examine repeated voluntary contributions to a carbon 
offsetting program during the online purchase of long-distance bus tickets. In the control 
group, travelers had the option to offset their carbon emissions resulting from their bus trip, 
but they could also simply ignore the offer. In the treatment group, travelers were forced to 
actively choose whether to offset their carbon emissions or not. This “active choice” 
requirement immediately increased participation in the offsetting program by almost 50%. 
Investigating returning customers, we find that this treatment remains effective over time. We 
report evidence that some customers tend to keep avoiding active contribution decisions in 
subsequent booking decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
Designing the choice architecture has become a popular tool to influence decision making, 
both in business and in public policy. As an important example, the effect of default options 
has been studied in a broad range of settings including organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein 
2003), health care services (Bellman et al. 2001), retirement plans (Beshears et al. 2008), 
green energy campaigns (Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008), electricity pricing programs 
(Cappers et al. 2015), or carbon offsetting (Araña and León 2012, Löfgren et al. 2012). 
Default options are often considered as a leading example for what is now discussed as  
“nudging” in the behavioral economics literature (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 
A key insight offered by this literature is that individuals tend to remain with the default. 
Participation rates are higher when participation is set as the default and subjects have the 
option to “opt out”, compared to a setting where non-participation is the default and subjects 
have the option to “opt in” (e.g., Johnson and Goldstein 2003). One potential explanation for 
this effect is inattention. Subjects might simply fail to pay attention that they actually had a 
choice. A related explanation refers to inertia and procrastination, as choosing against the 
default requires some effort, in particular, when decisions are more complex (e.g., Sunstein 
and Reisch 2013). Further explanations involve loss aversion as deviating from the status-quo 
has to provide a higher utility than the default itself (e.g., Dinner et al. 2011) or social 
conformity as defaults may signal appropriate behavior (e.g., McKenzie et al. 2006).  
While defaults may be beneficial to individuals who prefer not to take decisions themselves 
(Sunstein 2014), there is also a debate on the ethical limitations of their use (Smith et al. 
2013). As an example, the European Court of Justice ruled in 2012 that an “opt-out” was 
illegal in the case of travel insurance that had been automatically added to the online booking 
of passenger flights (European Court of Justice 2012).  
Consequently, the choice architect may want to rely on softer interventions in some contexts. 
Sunstein and Reisch (2013) suggest that especially in complex or morally loaded decisions, it 
may be tempting to refuse any decision at all. So why not simply require an explicit decision 
in such contexts? The “active choice” requirement may reduce the “moral wiggle room” that 
individuals tend to take advantage of (Dana et al. 2007) and may hence increase voluntary 
contributions to a public good. In fact, a series of papers has shown that an active choice 
requirement increases participation in the respective programs compared to an “opt-in” setting 
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in one-shot decisions (e.g., Johnson and Goldstein 2003, Pichert and Katsikopoulos 2008, 
Löfgren et al. 2012).  
In related work, Andreoni et al. (forthcoming) nicely demonstrate that a personal ask for 
donations during a supermarket visit, which might be seen as an alternative way to induce an 
explicit decision, stimulates higher contributions as opposed to a similar setting without any 
verbal conversation between the solicitor and the potential donor. At the same time, their 
findings reveal that some visitors of a supermarket are willing to accept some effort to avoid 
being asked for donations by choosing another entrance. DellaVigna et al. (2012) report 
similar behavior in a door-to-door fundraising campaign. They show that subjects try to avoid 
meeting a solicitor by indicating to be “not at home” when a fundraiser announced his arrival. 
This observed ask avoidance is considered as a strategic self-control mechanism to limit 
emotional responses that would otherwise induce own giving (Trachtman et al. 2015). 
While the literature seems to confirm that asking individuals to make a choice increases 
average contributions in the case of public goods, there are still many open questions. In the 
context of changes in the choice architecture, the literature typically focuses on the immediate 
short-term effects. In particular, there is a lack of insights regarding the long-term impacts of 
active choice settings in repeated consumption decisions. Does their effectiveness fade away 
over time? Does forcing individuals to make a decision also affect subsequent behavior? 
Moreover, little is known about the different behavioral channels causing the observed actual 
behavior. Are the reported effects driven by social pressure or by self-image concerns? 
In this paper, we study the effect of an active choice requirement on repeated decisions in the 
framework of a carbon offsetting program. In a large-scale field experiment, we examine 
voluntary contributions to a carbon offsetting program during the online purchase of a long-
distance bus ticket. Offsetting costs are individually calculated and linear in trip distance 
resulting in an average offsetting price of €0.23 per booking. In the baseline scenario, subjects 
have the opportunity to offset their carbon emission, but are also allowed to simply ignore the 
offer and to continue the booking process without participating in the program. This design 
represents an “opt-in” setting with non-participation as the default option. In the “active 
choice” condition, individuals are required to indicate their offsetting decision in order to 
finalize the purchase of their ticket. Given our randomization strategy, we are able to both 
investigate consumers’ first reaction to the different settings and to study repeated bookings of 
returning customers being assigned to the same treatment condition. This allows us to present 
one of the first analyses on the effect of “the ask” in repeated decisions. 
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The contribution of the paper is fourfold: First, we can show that the “active choice” 
requirement increases the share of travelers who offset their carbon emissions by almost 50% 
in the first booking decision. To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first evidence 
on the effects of this framework in a green or impure public good setting where contributions 
are explicitly tied to harm-related behavior.1  
Second, we confirm that asking for an explicit decision is effective in fostering public good 
contributions in a rather anonymous environment of online bookings with a lower degree of 
social pressure. As the privately requested decision triggers reactions that are similar to public 
verbal solicitations in the context of charitable giving, our results suggest that self-image 
concerns are an important driver of the observed effect. Together with recent evidence from 
Adena and Huck (2016) who investigate the effects of an active choice requirement on 
charitable giving in an online setting, our study provides one of the first insights into this 
question.  
Third, we add to the scarce literature on the long-term effects of the choice architecture. 
Investigating the behavior of returning customers within the same treatment conditions, we 
show that treatment effects of the active choice setting do not fade away over time but lead to 
persistent behavioral differences in subsequent decisions without substantially affecting the 
number of recurrences. Our design thereby enables us to shed light on the underlying 
behavioral channels. Two major long-run effects of the design requiring an active choice can 
be found. On the one hand, the share of deliberate participation, i.e. customers that choose to 
offset their corresponding carbon emissions without being forced to decide, is affected and 
remains substantially higher in repeated decisions compared to the control group. On the other 
hand, prompting those without a deliberate choice to indicate their decision still effectively 
increases the share of carbon neutral trips with decreasing efficiency over time. Our 
observations suggest that a significant share of the passengers constantly attempts to avoid the 
decision. This finding is consistent with the “avoiding the ask” argument as reported in 
DellaVigna et al. (2012) and Andreoni et al. (forthcoming).  
Finally, we can show the limitations of the long-term effects. The observed persistency seems 
to be restricted to sufficiently similar choice situations. When introducing matching and 
1 In previous field experimental studies on carbon offsetting and default setting, individuals offsetting costs were not related to the 
underlying trip. Löfgren et al. (2012) study decision behavior of air travelers to a scientific conference in Sweden in 2008. The underlying 
offsetting costs amount to €10 for flights from within Europe and €40 for flights from outside Europe. In a similar study, Araña and León 
(2012) consider fixed offsetting prices of €10, €20, €40 and €60 investigating the choice behavior for air travelers to scientific conventions 
and conferences in Gran Canaria from 2009-2011. 
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rebate subsidies and hence changing the choice environment, behavioral differences between 
the two groups fade away.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the offsetting 
program and the experimental design. In section 3, we report our results and section 4 
concludes.  
2. The field experiment 
2.1. The offsetting program 
We conducted the field experiment in collaboration with a German long-distance bus operator 
in October 2013 coinciding with the launch of the carbon offsetting program. The program 
was introduced without any advertising or pre-announcement and was part of the usual online 
booking system. It allowed passengers to buy one-way or return tickets for up to four 
passengers at a time. After having chosen their ticket for the bus travel, participants were 
asked whether they would like to offset their related carbon emissions (in kilograms of CO2) 
for a given price (in €). Offsets were sold at 8 cents per 100 passenger-kilometer.2 In order to 
minimize information costs, we provided detailed information on the carbon offsetting 
program upon request for those being interested upon request via click.3 In the final cart, 
passengers obtained a list of items they intended to buy (including their offsetting expenses). 
They were then asked to add their personal data (no additional information beyond the usual 
booking process was requested) and to enter their payment details. Collecting post-experiment 
questionnaire data reveals that the vast majority of the passengers were between 16 and 35 
years old. Most of them had an academic background. Men and women were equally 
represented.4 
2.2. Experimental design and procedure 
In the baseline condition, individuals were given the opportunity to offset their carbon 
emission by choosing “yes”. To decline the offer, they could choose “no”. However, they 
were also allowed to skip the decision and continue booking process by choosing “continue” 
2 Including both direct carbon emissions from fuel consumption (36g CO2/km) and the life-cycle-assessment for the vehicle based on the 
GEMIS database (IINAS 2013) individual carbon emissions amounted to 47g CO2 per passenger kilometer. The collaborating offsetting 
provider charged a price of €17.90 per ton CO2. 
3 The bus service provided the information that reductions in greenhouse gas emissions were achieved by supporting an energy efficiency 
project in the public sector dealing with improved household charcoal stoves in Accra/Ghana. Those reductions were certified as voluntary 
emissions reductions (VER) according to the Gold Standard, which is often considered the most rigorous international certification 
benchmark for quality and compliance of voluntary carbon offsetting programs. Using data from an online platform with more than 280 
offsetting projects from 97 providers, Conte and Kotchen (2010) show that offsets being labelled as a Gold Standard project allow for a price 
premium of 30%-65%. 
4 We distributed questionnaires both in the busses during randomly determined bus rides after the experiment was finished and online, using 
the bus operator’s email list of customers. In total, we obtained 403 observations. 
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at the bottom of the page. Consequently, they did not participate in the program.5 In the 
Active Choice (AC) condition, individuals faced the same design but an active choice was 
explicitly required. If subjects continued without having made their choice, the decision 
screen was again highlighted with a red frame and a decision request (“please select whether 
you would like to offset your emissions”) appeared (see translated screenshots in Figure A1). 
We assigned individuals randomly into the two treatment conditions based on a browser 
cookie (ID) being saved on the individuals’ devices when entering the website for the first 
time. If individuals interrupted the booking process, returned to the website later and the 
cookie was not deleted, they would remain within the same treatment. Given this 
randomization strategy, we are able to investigate repeated bookings of returning customers.  
3. Experimental results 
In total, we observe 11,311 booking decisions with 5,670 observations in the treatment and 
5,641 observations in the control group. Summary statistics do not reveal large differences in 
observables between both settings (see Table 1 for an overview). There is a small but 
significant difference in the share of females (AC: 53%, Control: 51%, p<0.05, Chi2-test) and 
the share of group bookings (AC: 10%, Control: 9%, p<0.10, Chi2-test). In addition, the 
request for more information on the offsetting program is slightly higher in the AC treatment 
but generally very low in both groups (AC: 5%, Control: 4%, p<0.01, Chi2-test). Within the 
treatment framework, 9,736 observations result from individuals purchasing a ticket for the 
first time whereas 1,575 are recorded from customers returning to the website for a 
subsequent booking. Returning rates are quite similar in both treatments: In the control group, 
subjects book 1.20 trips on average while in AC, we observe 1.18 trips per individual (p<0.10, 
Chi2-test). This result differs from the findings of Adena and Huck (2016) who report 
substantial dropout rates after forcing opera ticket bookers to make a donation decision during 
the booking process. On average, the travel length amounts to 279 km per booking resulting 
in corresponding CO2 emissions of 13.1 kg and an average offsetting price of €0.23. We start 
the discussion of the experimental results by first investigating individuals’ immediate 
response to the different default options. Then, we turn towards subsequent bookings from 
returning customers. 
 
5 We conducted several separate experiments to study different types of behavioral interventions with the same bus operator. The data for 
this paper are exclusively taken from the first part of the program. The subsequent treatments on (spillover-) effects of matching grants and 
price rebates are reported in Kesternich et al. (2016). In this paper, we distinguish between two treatment conditions. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics by control and treatment group 
Treatment Control Active 
Choice 
All 
Total ticket price (€) 18.53 18.81 18.67 
 (11.91) (11.55) (11.73) 
Offset price (share of total ticket price) 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
CO2 emissions per booking (kg) 13.2 13.2 13.1 
 (9.2) (9.1) (9.1) 
Travel length per booking (km) 278.1 280.5 279.3 
 (195.3) (192.6) (193.9) 
Group ticket (1 = yes) 0.09 0.10* 0.09 
 (0.28) (0.30) (0.29) 
Return ticket (1 = yes) 0.30 0.30 0.30 
 (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) 
Voucher (1 = yes)  0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Info button request (1 = yes) 0.04 0.05*** 0.04 
 (0.19) (0.22) (0.19) 
Female (1 = yes) 0.51 0.53** 0.52 
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) 
Bookings (# of bookings by same ID)  1.20 1.18* 1.19 
 (0.60) (0.53) (0.57) 
Observations 5,641 5,670 11,311 
Notes: Means are reported by treatment group, standard deviations in parentheses, asterisks indicate significant differences between Control 
and Active Choice, in means (t-tests) or proportions (Chi2-test), respectively, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. A correction for multiple 
hypotheses testing as suggested by List et al. (2016) reveals that the differences in female and bookings are not significant anymore. The 
difference in Info button request and group ticket however persists. 
3.1. First booking decision 
While we analyze final participation to show the main effects of the treatment, we will also 
consider two distinct forms of participation for a deeper analysis: Deliberate participation 
refers to the deliberate decision to offset without seeing the reminder to make a decision. By 
construction, individuals in the control treatment can only be deliberate participants. Hence, 
the two forms coincide in these treatments. In the AC treatment, however, subjects could also 
choose to participate after they saw the reminder that prompted them to make a decision. If 
subjects are undecided at first and then opt to compensate their emissions, we will refer to this 
behavior as prompted participation.  
In the first booking decision, a significantly higher share of travelers, i.e. deliberate and 
prompted participants, offset their carbon emissions in the AC treatment (26.5%) compared to 
the control group (17.7%) (Figure 1, left side panel) (p<0.01, Chi2-test). This observation is in 
line with findings on organ donations reported in Johnson and Goldstein (2003) based on an 
online experiment. They report participation rates in an AC treatment (79%) to be 
significantly higher than in an opt-in design (42%).6 Also in the context of retirement savings, 
Carroll et al. (2009) find that savings plan enrollment among employees is 28 percentage 
6 They also investigate participation decision in an opt-out frame and find no statistical differences between opt-out (82%) and AC.  
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points higher under an active decision regime than under a standard opt-in enrollment regime. 
Finally, our findings also correspond to the results obtained by Löfgren et al. (2012) on 
carbon offsetting even though the differences they find between AC (46.8%) and opt-in 
(39.3%) do not differ significantly from zero. The authors explain the missing significance 
with the characteristics of their subject pool mainly of environmental economists. They 
conclude that default effects may attenuate with market experience.  
We find equal shares of deliberate participation in the AC treatment (18.0% of all AC 
participants) and in the control group (17.7%) (Figure 1). This finding indicates that the 
treatment effect is not driven by a selection bias. Of all participants in AC, 48.7% do not 
deliberately indicate their decision. About 17.5% of these individuals (amounting for 8.5% of 
the entire AC sample) choose to opt-in when the decision becomes compulsory. This results 
in an overall increase of participants by roughly 50% in contrast to the control group (AC: 
26.5%, control: 17.7%) in the first booking decision. The remaining 82.5% of those being 
reminded decide not to take part in the program when the decision becomes compulsory. 
Applying a binary logit model indicates that the differences in participation rates between the 
two treatment conditions are significantly different from zero both in an empirical model with 
the treatment variable only (Table 2, column 1) and in an expanded model with a set of 
control variables (column 2). The econometric results predict participation in the offsetting 
program to increase by about 9 percentage points when the choice architecture requires an 
active choice. 
At first glance, this effect might be mainly driven by inattention. One might suspect that 
people simply overlook the offsetting possibility in the booking process. In the following, we 
study decision behavior of returning customers to shed further light on this possibility.  
 
7 
Figure 1: Participation in repeated bookings (1st to 3rd booking decision) 
1st booking decision 2nd booking decision 3rd booking decision 
   
 
 
 
Table 2: Treatment effects, first booking decision 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Participation Participation 
   
Active choice 0.088*** 0.089*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Controls No Yes 
Observations 9,736 9,736 
Notes: Discrete probability effects for treatment indicators are calculated after the ML estimation,  
the set of control variables contains: CO2 emissions per booking, offset price, voucher (1 = yes), 
female (1 = yes), standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01. 
 
17.7 18.0 
8.5 
40.2 
33.3 
82.3 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Control
N=4839
Active Choice
 N=4897
16.3 17.0 
6.4 
28.6 
48.1 
83.7 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Control
N=596
Active Choice
N=595
12.7 16.0 
5.0 
25.2 
53.8 
87.3 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Control (n=134) Active Choice (n=119)
8 
3.2. Second booking decision and after 
Due to our randomization procedure, repeated customers were reassigned to the same 
treatment. We are therefore able to observe the number of repeated bookings of the same 
passenger, indicating the number of times the individual has been exposed to the treatment. 
Analyzing subsequent bookings of returning customers allows us to investigate “follow-up” 
behavior and hence to explore potential long-term effects of the choice structure. 
Figure 1 displays the share of passengers that offset their emissions over three subsequent 
bookings. In the active choice condition, participation is constantly higher in all subsequent 
booking decisions (2nd decision: 23.4% vs. 16.3%, p<0.01; 3rd decision: 21.0% vs. 12.7%, 
p<0.10, Chi2-test). Also in relative terms, effect sizes are relatively stable over time (+50% in 
the first decision, +44% in the second decision, +62% in the third decision). A set of logit 
regressions confirms the observed treatment effects (Table 3). Absolute effects even seem to 
increase for subjects taking their 4th decision. However, given the small number of 
observations in this subgroup, we suspect higher levels of noise for this estimate.  
Summarizing, the AC choice architecture does not only increase participation in the first 
booking decision but also fosters offsetting in repeated booking decisions. 
Table 3: Treatment effects, second booking decision and beyond 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Participation 
2nd decision 
Participation 
3rd decision 
Participation 
4th decision 
    
Active choice 0.075*** 0.081* 0.149** 
 (0.023) (0.045) (0.073) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,191 253 84 
Notes: Discrete probability effects for treatment indicators are calculated after the ML estimation, the set of control variables contains: CO2 
emissions per booking, offset price, voucher (1 = yes), female (1 = yes), standard errors in parentheses, ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
In a next step, we take a closer look at the development of the two groups over time. There is 
a clear downward trend in the control group where participations rates drop by 28% to only 
12.7% in the third booking decision (Figure 1). In the AC condition, we also observe a 
reduction in overall participation over time, but the effect appears to be weaker. Here, overall 
offsetting rates drop from 26.5% to about 21.0% in the third booking decision. 
The weaker decrease in participation in the AC condition also holds for those who 
deliberately choose to offset. While the share of deliberate participation in AC was equal to 
the control group in the first booking decision (18.0% of all participants), it remains higher in 
all subsequent decisions (17.0% in AC compared to 16.3% in control in the second booking, 
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16.0% in AC compared to 12.7% in the third booking). We test for a trend in deliberate 
participation and find a significant (negative) coefficient only for the case of the control 
treatment (see Table 4).  
Table 4: Deliberate participation, second booking decision and beyond 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Deliberate 
Participation 
All 
Deliberate 
Participation 
Only control 
Deliberate 
Participation 
Only AC 
    
Active choice -0.0201   
 (0.0387)   
Recurrences -0.0302* -0.0306* 0.000745 
 (0.0180) (0.0170) (0.0182) 
Recurrences X Active Choice 0.0327   
 (0.0253)   
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,575 802 773 
Notes: Discrete probability effects for treatment indicators are calculated after the ML estimation, Recurrences counts the number of repeated 
booking decisions, the set of further control variables contains: CO2 emissions per booking, offset price, voucher (1 = yes), info button 
request (1 = yes), female (1 = yes), standard errors in parentheses, *p<0.10. 
 
Could the observed effects mainly be driven by passengers that simply fail to notice the 
offsetting option in the booking process? First, this seems unlikely as the offsetting program 
has been highlighted prominently in the booking system (see screenshot in Table A1).  
Second, even if passengers had indeed overseen the option in the first booking decision, it 
would be less likely to happen in subsequent booking decisions in the AC group as they were 
prompted to make a decision during the first booking. Hence, after their first booking, all 
subjects should have been made aware of the offsetting option. If only unawareness was the 
driver of the effect in the first booking, the prompt should be ineffective (or at least much less 
effective) in the second booking. We observe, however, that the effect of the prompt remains 
rather stable when comparing the first and second bookings. Again, a substantial share of 
passengers chooses to offset only when prompted to decide. (Figure 1). This observation 
provides first insights that a significant proportion of passengers continuously tries to avoid 
taking an offsetting decision in AC.  
Analyzing individual behavior in repeated booking decisions supports this argument even 
more. Table 5 reports a transition matrix for returning customers, comparing their behavior 
between the first and the second booking. A crucial insight is that individuals in general tend 
to stick to their previous decision (see diagonal entries). Of the deliberate compensators, 
76.3% again confirm their choice in the second booking decision. Similarly, 73.1% of the 
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deliberate non-participants again actively decline to take part in the program in the second 
booking.  
Behavior is less stable for those who were prompted to decide, but we observe substantial 
stability here as well. Nearly half of the prompted participants (49.2%) and prompted non-
participants (44.8%) show the same patterns in the second booking. This provides further 
evidence that the individuals consciously avoid decision taking. If behavior in the first 
booking decision was mainly due to unawareness of the offsetting option, prompted travelers 
should not behave differently from their deliberate counterparts in subsequent decisions. 
However, prompted offsetters and deliberate offsetters again differ in terms of deliberate 
participation when booking for the second time (25.4% vs. 76.3%, p<0.001, Chi2-test). 
Instead, a much larger share of the prompted participants again waits for the prompt to decide 
before choosing to participate (49.2% vs. 3.2%, p<0.001, Chi2-test). Similar differences are 
observed for prompted vs. deliberate non-participants. 
Most notably, the switch of prompted to deliberate choices is not symmetric for participants 
and non-participants. 25.4% of the prompted compensators deliberately take part in the 
program when returning to the website for the next time (Table 5 and Figure A2).7 This 
picture looks different for those passengers who chose not to participate when prompted 
during their first booking. We observe that 49.6% of these individuals now deliberately 
decline to offset their emissions. The difference between the two groups is significant (25.4% 
vs. 49.6%, p<0.001, Chi2-test). One potential explanation for this observation is that saying 
“No” in the presence of the highlighted active choice request may be perceived as even less 
pleasant than saying “No” in the more neutral screen prior to the prompt. This explanation 
adds a new facet to the idea of strategic ask avoidance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 10.2% of the prompted participants now act as deliberate non-participants. That is, in total 35.6% of the prompted participants in the first 
booking decision make a choice without having to be reminded in the second booking decision. 64.5% of the first booking “prompted 
participants” again see the request for taking action in the second booking. The majority of them (49.2% of all first booking prompted 
participants) finally enter the offsetting program again as prompted participants in the second booking decision. 
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Table 5: Subsequent decision behavior, transition matrix  
Dec 2 
 
Dec 1 
No Undecided 
No 
Undecided 
Yes 
Yes Obs 
No 141 45 0 7 193 
 (73.1%) (23.3%) (0.0%) (3.6%) (100%) 
UndecidedNo 124 112 6 8 250 
 (49.6%) (44.8%) (2.4%) (3.2%) (100%) 
UndecidedYes 6 9 29 15 59 
 (10.2%) (15.3%) (49.2%) (25.4%) (100%) 
Yes 15 4 3 71 93 
 (16.1%) (4.3%) (3.2%) (76.3%) (100%) 
Obs 286 170 38 101 595 
 
Finally, we address the potential concern that subjects may have only limited memory and, 
despite being reminded of the offsetting program in their first booking decision, are again 
unaware of this option when returning for their next booking. If this was true, the effect of the 
request to decide should be weaker for quick returners and should increase with the time 
between the two bookings. However, as depicted in Figure 2, the effect of the prompt seems 
to be stable. If at all, it is even higher if there is little time between the two decisions.8 
Similarly, also the shares of deliberate participation speak against this hypothesis, as there is 
even a mild increase for larger time lags, and generally similar levels as in the control group. 
As the time between bookings does not affect behavior, we have no reason to believe in 
restored unawareness due to bad memory. 
Figure 2: Participation rates in second booking depending on temporal distance between 
the first and the second booking decision 
 
Note: Number of observations: Control: n=97 (< 1 day: n=33; > 1 day(s) < 7 days: n=39; > 7 days: n=25), Active Choice: n=139 (< 1 day: 
n=41, delib. participation n=26; > 1 day(s) < 7 days: n=58, delib. participation n=44; > 7 days: n=40, delib. participation n=31) 
8 Similarly, also the share of all prompted subjects, i.e. both prompted participants and non-participants, does not increase with the temporal 
distance between bookings. 
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In summary, we observe two major long-run effects of the design requiring an active choice: 
First, the share of deliberate participation remains higher in contrast to the control group. 
Second, requiring an active choice still effectively increases the share of carbon neutral trips 
with decreasing efficiency over time. A substantial share of prompted individuals again 
requires prompting in subsequent bookings. Comparing follow-up behavior of prompted 
participants and prompted non-participants as well as investigating subsequent behavior of 
deliberate and prompted participants provides suggestive evidence that subjects continuously 
try to avoid an explicit decision. 
3.3. Persistence of treatment effects 
Finally, we analyze whether the active choice treatment also affects behavior after treatment 
removal and leads to spillover effects. We observe returning customers in a subsequent 
experimental phase where treatment differences between the two groups were removed. In 
this follow-up phase, all subjects were asked to decide actively. In addition, some subjects 
received subsidies. In three rebate conditions, customers paid only 75%, 50%, or 25% of the 
normal price to offset their emissions. In three corresponding matching conditions, the 
amount of carbon offset was increased by 33.3%, 100% and 300% at no cost, resulting in 
similar relative prices as in the rebate conditions (see Kesternich et al., 2016).9  
Using data from these subsequent decisions, we compare behavior conditional on whether 
individuals were previously assigned to the AC or the control condition. Figure 3 illustrates 
that the tendency observed in Figure 1 persists in the absence of subsidies. Being assigned to 
the AC condition in the first phase (AC-AC) leads to higher participation rates even though 
subjects now face the same environment when making their offsetting decision (31% vs. 15%, 
p=0.17, Chi2-test, first booking decision in the subsequent phase).10 This spillover effect 
vanishes once customers face a new choice situation with additional monetary incentives. 
When adding (matching or rebate) subsidies, behavior is much more similar (25% vs. 22%, 
p=0.58, Chi2-test).  
While the additional incentives qualitatively increase participation of the former control group 
subject, there is even a drop in participation for those who had faced the active choice 
condition in previous bookings. Observed levels in the presence of financial subsidies are 
weakly (but insignificantly) lower than in AC-AC, both for AC-rebate (31% vs. 28%, p=0.73, 
9 Note that for our analysis in Kesternich et al. (2016) we excluded all IDs that took part in part 1 of the program. 
10 When including subsequent bookings in this phase, differences become slightly more significant (e.g. p=0.13 for this test). The results do 
not change substantially when using offsetting quantities instead of participation as dependent variable.  
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Chi2-test) and AC-Match (31% vs. 22%, p=0.36, Chi2-test). While our experimental design 
cannot provide a full rationale for this behavior, exploring participation behavior under 
switching incentives in more detail reveals some interesting patterns even though the 
observations are based on a rather small sample size. Table A1 shows the participation of an 
individual in the first booking in phase 2 (with AC, rebate or matches) depending on the 
participation decision in the last booking in phase 1 in AC. Under AC-AC, nearly 83% of the 
participants stick to their decision (participation or no participation) when moving to the 
second phase of the experiment. In AC-Rebate, 8% of the total participants additionally step 
into the program when learning about a rebate scheme for the first time while no one drops 
out. In contrast, in AC-Match, the share of participants decreases. While about 4% of total 
participants who had not compensated in phase 1 now additionally step into the program 
when seeing the match for the first time, 10.5% drops out of the program when being assigned 
to a match treatment. While the matching mechanism increases participation (to some extent) 
at the extensive margin, a larger share of participants drops out of the program. One might 
speculate that subjects react differently to the different forms of incentives. In particular, 
applying active choice requirements and matching schemes subsequently may lead to 
motivational crowding out. Based on the observed levels, adding a matching scheme to an 
active choice requirement may even be counterproductive.  
Figure 3: Persistence of treatment effects  
 
Note: The first row shows treatment assignment in the first phase (Control or Active Choice). The second row shows treatment assignment in 
the second phase (Active Choice, Rebate or Match). E.g., we find that the total share of participants in Active Choice in the second phase is 
higher (0.31) if subjects have been already assigned to Active Choice in the first phase compared to having been assigned to Control in the 
first phase (0.15).  
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4. Conclusion 
This paper analyzed the effect of being repeatedly asked for an active choice in a voluntary 
carbon offsetting program. In line with previous findings, our experimental results indicate 
that an “active choice” condition is able to increase the share of travelers who offset the 
carbon emissions from their long-distance bus travel by almost 50% compared to a control 
condition where they could simply ignore the offsetting option. Most notably, we find similar 
treatment effects when analyzing repeated bookings, providing evidence that active choice 
requirements maintain increased contributions in the context of iterated decision making. The 
data from returning customers also provide insights into the underlying decision processes. 
We observe a substantial share of subjects not responding to the “ask”, even if they were 
made aware of the offsetting option in a previous booking. This provides suggestive evidence 
that the effectiveness of the active choice condition is unlikely to be driven by inattention to 
the offsetting option, but rather by individuals continuously trying to avoid the decision. 
The observed decision avoidance can be rationalized in different ways. To decide upon 
participation, subjects may try to evaluate how the offsetting program affects climate change. 
This might result in a complex analysis of different channels, considering questions of 
whether emissions from the bus travel have been correctly calculated, whether the offsetting 
program is effective, or whether individual action on climate change really makes a difference 
in the end. Hence, choice avoidance could simply result from individuals not wanting to 
engage in a complex decision as pointed out by Sunstein and Reisch (2013). As participation 
in the offsetting program results in voluntary contributions to a public good, an additional line 
of reasoning is worth considering. Altruistic persons may attempt to avoid being asked for 
voluntary contributions. Andreoni et al. (forthcoming) argue that there is a trade-off for 
altruists in such situations: either they give and feel good or they do not give and feel guilty. 
Sophisticated altruists, aware of these options, may try to avoid the “ask”. Our study adds to 
the field experimental evidence provided by Andreoni et al. (forthcoming). They observe 
behavior in response to a public ask which may serves as a way to enforce decision-making 
and at the same time induces social pressure on the answer itself. Hence, it remains unclear 
which of the two channels dominates and, in particular, if the public nature of the “ask” is a 
prerequisite for the observed effect. 
In our setting, we use a more anonymous enforcement mechanism of decision-making and 
find similar results. Hence, our findings suggest that even a computerized “ask” presented on 
a website, without any public exposure, can lead to similar avoidance behavior as being 
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confronted with a personal “ask”, with eye contact, as long as individuals are forced to take a 
decision. This points out a potentially neglected role of a public ask: it may simply force 
individuals to take a decision. In terms of self-image concerns, being non-responsive to a 
demand explicitly directed to oneself may come close to explicitly denying to give. In both 
cases, there is little room for excuses, like pretending to oneself not to have seen the “ask”. As 
we found similar effects when introducing a mechanical enforcement of decision-making in 
the anonymous setting of online bookings, it seems likely that self-image concerns alone can 
provoke choice avoiders to change their behavior, even without any human interaction. Adena 
and Huck (2016) present evidence that points into a similar direction. In contrast to their 
findings, however, we do not observe a decline in subsequent participation. This could be due 
to the fact that the contribution levels were smaller in our case or because we studied 
contributions to a green good, which explicitly links public goods contributions to individual 
harm-related behavior. Future research could explore these channels and extend our analysis 
by systematically varying stakes, goods or by looking at even longer time series. 
From a policy perspective, our results indicate that requiring an active choice can have strong 
effects. This form of intervention hence represents an interesting alternative to opt-out 
settings, which face legal challenges in many countries. Our results add to the debate on how 
to apply nudges, e.g. to promote environmental policy goals (List and Price 2016). In 
particular, we demonstrate that engaging people in an active decision on whether to offset 
their carbon emissions has a positive effect on participation not only in the short-term but also 
in the long-term. Individual dynamics revealed a significant degree of persistency in behavior, 
leading to behavioral spillover for decisions in sufficiently similar situations. Subjects in AC 
participate more often in subsequent unprompted decisions. On the other hand, subjects given 
the possibility to avoid the ask for some time continue to contribute less than subjects in the 
AC condition even when both groups are asked to make an active choice. These findings go 
beyond the measurement of immediate effects and suggest that the choice architecture might 
affect the formation of individual preferences.    
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Annex 
Figure A1: Translated screenshots of control (left side) and Active choice treatment (right side) 
YOUR CHOSEN TRIP
BUS TRIP PRICE
1. Frankfurt a. M. ➔ Munich
Departure: THU, November 7, 2013, 12:00pm
Passenger:
Max Mustermann
Phone number:
012345678
24.00 €
2. Munich ➔ Frankfurt a.M
Departure: SUN, November 10, 2013, 11:35pm
Passenger:
Max Mustermann
Phone number:
012345678
29.00 €
Your bus trip generates 41.4 kg CO2 emissions. These emissions can be offset at a cost of 0.74€. 
Do you want to offset your emissions for 0.74€?
CO2 COMPENSATION
Additional information
Yes No
 
YOUR CHOSEN TRIP
BUS TRIP PRICE
1. Frankfurt a. M. ➔ Munich
Departure: THU, November 7, 2013, 12:00pm
Passenger:
Max Mustermann
Phone number:
012345678
24.00 €
2. Munich ➔ Frankfurt a.M
Departure: SUN, November 10, 2013, 11:35pm
Passenger:
Max Mustermann
Phone number:
012345678
29.00 €
Your bus trip generates 41.4 kg CO2 emissions. These emissions can be offset at a cost of 0.74€. 
Do you want to offset your emissions for 0.74€?
CO2 COMPENSATION
Additional information
Yes No
Please select whether you would like to offset your emissions.
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Figure A2: Subsequent decision behavior of prompted (non-) participants  
Non-deliberate participants Non-deliberate non-participants 
  
 
Table A1: Changing incentives and participation 
   AC (Phase 2) Rebate (Phase 2) Match (Phase 2) 
   Compensated  Compensated  Compensated  
   no yes TOTAL No yes TOTAL no yes TOTAL 
A
C
 (P
ha
se
 1
) 
co
m
pe
ns
at
ed
 no N=17 
(58.6%) 
N=2 
(6.9%) 
N=19 
 
N=55 
(72.4%) 
N=6 
(7.9%) 
N=61 N=51 
(67.1%) 
N=3 
(3.9%) 
N=54 
yes N=3 
(10.3%) 
N=7 
(24.1%) 
N=10 
 
N=0 
(0%) 
N=15 
(19.7%) 
N=15 N=8 
(10.5%) 
N=14 
(18.4%) 
N=22 
 TOTAL N=20 
 
N=9 
 
N=29 
 
N=55 N=21 N=76 N=59 N=17 N=76 
Note: This table shows compensation behavior in the first booking decision in phase 2 (with AC, rebate or matching) depending on the 
decision behavior during the last booking in phase 1 in AC. E.g., in total 29 participants of phase 1 also participated in phase 2. In both 
phases, they faced a AC design. Out of these 29 observations, 17 individuals (58.6% of 29) did not compensate in both bookings, 7 (24.1%) 
individuals compensated in one of the two booking decisions. 2 (3) individuals did not compensate in phase 1 (2) but compensated in phase 2 
(1). 
 
   AC (Phase 2) Rebate (Phase 2) Match (Phase 2) 
   Compensated  Compensated  Compensated  
   no yes TOTAL no yes TOTAL no yes TOTAL 
C
on
tro
l (
Ph
as
e 
1)
 
co
m
pe
ns
at
ed
 no N=22 
(84.6%) 
N=3 
(11.5%) 
N=25 N=49 
(70%) 
N=6 
(8.6%) 
N=55 N=49 
(76.6%) 
N=2 
(3.1%) 
N=51 
yes N=0 
(0%) 
N=1 
(3.8%) 
N=1 N=3 
(4.2%) 
N=12 
(19.2%) 
N=15 N=3 
(4.7%) 
N=10 
(15.6%) 
N=13 
 TOTAL N=22 N=4 N=26 N=52 N=18 N=70 N=52 N=12 N=64 
Note: This table shows compensation behavior in the first booking decision in phase 2 (with AC, rebate or matching) depending on the 
decision behavior during the last booking in phase 1 in control. E.g., in total 26 participants of phase 1 also participated in phase 2. In phase 
1, the faced a control design (Opt-in) and in phase 2 they faced a AC design. Out of these 26 observations, 22 individuals (84.6% of 25) did 
not compensate in both bookings, 1 individual compensated in both booking decisions. 0 (3) individual(s) did not compensate in phase 1 (2) 
but compensated in phase 2 (1). 
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